Conceived before the First World War is  Oswald Spengler’s magisterial work, Der Untergang des Abendlandes  (Munich, 1918). Read in this country chiefly in the brilliantly faithful  translation by Charles Francis Atkinson, The Decline of the West (New  York, two volumes, 1926-28), Spengler’s morphology of history was the  great intellectual achievement of our century. Whatever our opinion of  his methods or conclusions, we cannot deny that he was the Copernicus of  historionomy. All subsequent writings on the philosophy of history may  fairly be described as criticism of the Decline of the West. [Image:  Revilo Oliver in 1938.]
Spengler, having formulated a universal history, undertook an analysis  of the forces operating in the immediately contemporary world. This he  set forth in a masterly work, Die Jahre der Entscheidung, of which only  the first volume could be published in Germany (Munich, 1933) and  translated into English (The Hour of Decision, New York, 1934). One had  only to read this brilliant work, with its lucid analysis of forces that  even acute observers did not perceive until 25 or 30 years later, and  with its prevision that subsequent events have now shown to have been  absolutely correct, to recognize that its author was one of the great  political and philosophical minds of the West. One should remember,  however, that the amazing accuracy of his analysis of the contemporary  situation does not necessarily prove the validity of his historical  morphology.
The publication of Spengler’s first volume in 1918 released a spate of  controversy that continues to the present day. Manfred Schroeter in Der  Streit um Spengler (Munich, 1922) was able to give a précis of the  critiques that had appeared in a little more than three years; today, a  mere bibliography, if reasonably complete, would take years to compile  and would probably run to eight hundred or a thousand printed pages.
Spengler naturally stirred up swarms of nit-wits, who were particularly  incensed by his immoral and preposterous suggestion that there could be  another war in Europe, when everybody knew that there just couldn’t be  anything but World Peace after 1918, ’cause Santa had just brought a  nice, new, shiny “League of Nations.” Such “liberal” chatterboxes are  always making a noise, but no one with the slightest knowledge of human  history pays any attention to them, except as symptoms.
Unfortunately, much more intelligent criticism of Spengler was motivated  by emotional dissatisfaction with his conclusions. In an article in  Antiquity for 1927, the learned R.S. Collingwood of Oxford went so far  as to claim that Spengler’s two volumes had not given him “a single  genuinely new idea,” and that he had “long ago carried out for  himself”—and, of course, rejected—even Spengler’s detailed analyses of  individual cultures. As a cursory glance at Spengler’s work will suffice  to show, that assertion is less plausible than a claim to know  everything contained in the Twelfth Edition of the Encyclopaedia  Britannica. Collingwood, the author of the Speculum Mentis and other  philosophical works, must have been bedeviled with emotional resentments  so strong that he could not see how conceited, arrogant and improbable  his vaunt would seem to most readers.
It is now a truism that Spengler’s “pessimism” and “fatalism” was an  unbearable shock to minds nurtured in the nineteenth-century illusion  that everything would get better and better forever and ever. Spengler’s  cyclic interpretation of history stated that a civilization was an  organism having a definite and fixed life-span and moving from infancy  to senescence and death by an internal necessity comparable to the  biological necessity that decrees the development of the human organism  from infantile imbecility to senile decrepitude. Napoleon, for example,  was the counterpart of Alexander in the ancient world.
We were now, therefore, in a phase of civilizational life in which  constitutional forms are supplanted by the prestige of individuals. By  2000, we shall be “contemporary” with the Rome of Sulla, the Egypt of  the Eighteenth Dynasty, and China at the time when the “Contending  States” were welded into an empire. That means that we face an age of  world wars and what is worse, civil wars and proscriptions, and that  around 2060 the West (if not destroyed by its alien enemies) will be  united under the personal rule of a Caesar or Augustus. That is not a  pleasant prospect.
Greatness or Optimism
The only question before us, however, is whether Spengler is correct  in his analysis. Rational men will regard as irrelevant the fact that  his conclusions are not charming. If a physician informs you that you  have symptoms of arteriosclerosis, he may or may not be right in his  diagnosis, but it is absolutely certain that you cannot rejuvenate  yourself by slapping his face.
Every detached observer of our times, I think, will agree that  Spengler’s “pessimism” aroused emotions that precluded rational  consideration. I am inclined to believe that the moral level of his  thinking was a greater obstacle. His “fatalism” was not the comforting  kind that permits men to throw up their hands and eschew  responsibilities. Consider, for example, the concluding lines of his Men  and Technics (New York, 1932):
Already the danger is so great, for every individual, every class, every  people, that to cherish any illusion whatever is deplorable. Time does  not suffer itself to be halted; there is no question of prudent retreat  or wise renunciation. Only dreamers believe that there is a way out.  Optimism is cowardice.
We are born into this time and must bravely follow the path to the  destined end. There is no other way. Our duty is to hold on to the lost  position, without hope, without rescue, like that Roman soldier whose  bones were found in front of a door in Pompeii, who, during the eruption  of Vesuvius, died at his post because they forgot to relieve him. That  is greatness. That is what it means to be a thoroughbred. The honorable  end is the one thing that can not be taken from a man.
Now, whether or not the stern prognostication that lies back of that  conclusion is correct, no man fit to live in the present can read those  lines without feeling his heart lifted by the great ethos of a noble  culture—the spiritual strength of the West that can know tragedy and be  unafraid. And simultaneously, that pronouncement will affright to  hysteria the epicene homunculi among us, the puling cowards who hope  only to scuttle about safely in the darkness and to batten on the decay  of a culture infinitely beyond their comprehension.
That contrast is in itself a very significant datum for an estimate of  the present condition of our civilization … 
Three Points of Criticism
Criticism of Spengler, therefore, if it is not to seem mere  quibbling about details, must deal with major premises. Now, so far as I  can see, Spengler’s thesis can be challenged at three really  fundamental points, namely:
(1) Spengler regards each civilization as a closed and isolated entity  animated by a dominant idea, or Weltanschauung, that is its “soul.” Why  should ideas, or concepts, the impalpable creations of the human mind,  undergo an organic evolution as though they were living protoplasm,  which, as a material substance, is understandably subject to chemical  change and hence biological laws? This logical objection is not  conclusive: Men may observe the tides, for example, and even predict  them, without being able to explain what causes them. But when we must  deduce historical laws from the four of five civilizations of which we  have some fairly accurate knowledge, we do not have enough repetitions  of a phenomenon to calculate its periodicity with assurance, if we do  not know why it happens.
(2) A far graver difficulty arises from the historical fact that we have  already mentioned. For five centuries, at least, the men of the West  regarded modern civilization as a revival or prolongation of  Graeco-Roman antiquity. Spengler, as the very basis of his hypothesis,  regards the Classical world as a civilization distinct from, and alien  to, our own—a civilization that, like the Egyptian, lived, died, and is  now gone. It was dominated by an entirely different Weltanschauung, and  consequently the educated men of Europe and America, who for five  centuries believed in continuity, were merely suffering from an illusion  or hallucination.
Even if we grant that, however, we are still confronted by a unique  historical phenomenon. The Egyptian, Babylonian, Chinese, Hindu, and  Arabian (“Magian”), civilizations are all regarded by Spengler (and  other proponents of an organic structure of culture) as single and  unrelated organisms: Each came into being without deriving its concepts  from another civilization (or, alternatively, seeing its own concepts in  the records of an earlier civilization), and each died leaving no  offspring (or, alternatively, no subsequent civilization thought to see  in them its own concepts). There is simply no parallel or precedent for  the relationship (real or imaginary) which links Graeco-Roman culture to  our own.
Since Spengler wrote, a great historical discovery has further  complicated the question. We now know that the Mycenaean peoples were  Greeks, and it is virtually certain that the essentials of their culture  survived the disintegration caused by the Dorian invasion, and were the  basis of later Greek culture. (For a good summary, see Leonard R.  Palmer, Mycenaeans and Minoans, London, 1961). We therefore have a  sequence that is, so far as we know, unique:
Mycenaean>Dark Ages>Graeco-Roman>Dark Ages>Modern. If this  is one civilization, it has had a creative life-span far longer than  that of any other that has thus far appeared in the world. If it is more  than one, the interrelations form an exception to Spengler’s general  law, and suggest the possibility that a civilization, if it dies by some  kind of quasi-biological process, may in some cases have a  quasi-biological power of reproduction.
The exception becomes even more remarkable if we, unlike Spengler,  regard as fundamentally important the concept of self-government, which  may have been present even in Mycenaean times (see L. R. Palmer,  Mycenaeans and Minoans, cited above, p. 97). Democracies and  constitutional republics are found only in the Graeco-Roman world and  our own; such institutions seem to have been incomprehensible to other  cultures. [Image: “Mask of Agamemnon,” funerary mask from a shaft tomb  at Mycenae, c. 1500 BC.]
(3) For all practical purposes, Spengler ignores hereditary and racial  differences. He even uses the word “race” to represent a qualitative  difference between members of what we should call the same race, and he  denies that that difference is to any significant extent caused by  heredity. He regards biological races as plastic and mutable, even in  their physical characteristics, under the influence of geographical  factors (including the soil, which is said to affect the physical  organism through food) and of what Spengler terms “a mysterious cosmic  force” that has nothing to do with biology. The only real unity is  cultural, that is, the fundamental ideas and beliefs shared by the  peoples who form a civilization. Thus Spengler, who makes those ideas  subject to quasi-biological growth and decay, oddly rejects as  insignificant the findings of biological science concerning living  organisms.
It is true, of course, that man is in part a spiritual being. Of that,  persons who have a religious faith need no assurance. Others, unless  they are determined blindly to deny the evidence before us, must admit  the existence of phenomena of the kind described by Franz E. Winkler,  M.D., in Man the Bridge Between Two Worlds (New York, Harper, 1960),  and, of course, by many other writers. And every historian knows that no  one of the higher cultures could conceivably have come into being, if  human beings are merely animals.
But it is also true that the science of genetics, founded by Father  Mendel only a century ago and almost totally neglected down to the early  years of the Twentieth Century, has ascertained biological laws that  can be denied only by denying the reality of the physical world. Every  educated person knows that the color of a man’s eyes, the shape of the  lobes of his ears, and every one of his other physiological  characteristics is determined by hereditary factors. It is virtually  certain that intellectual capacity is likewise produced by inheritance,  and there is a fair amount of evidence that indicated that even moral  capacities are likewise innate.
Man’s power of intervention in the development of inherited qualities  appears to be entirely negative, thus affording another melancholy proof  that human ingenuity can easily destroy what it can never create. Any  fool with a knife can in three minutes make the most beautiful woman  forever hideous, and one of our “mental health experts,” even without  using a knife, can as quickly and permanently destroy the finest  intellect. And it appears that less drastic interventions, through  education and other control of environment, may temporarily or even  permanently pervert and deform, but are powerless to create capacities  that an individual did not inherit from near or more remote ancestors.
The facts are beyond question, although the Secret Police in Soviet  Russia and “liberal” spitting-squads in the United States have largely  succeeded in keeping these facts from the general public in the areas  they control. But no amount of terrorism can alter the laws of nature.  For a readable exposition of genetics, see Garrett Hardin’s Nature and  Man’s Fate (New York, Rinehart, 1959), which is subject only to the  reservation that the laws of genetics, like the laws of chemistry, are  verified by observation every day, whereas the doctrine of biological  evolution is necessarily an hypothesis that cannot be verified by  experiment. 
The Race Factor
It is also beyond question that the races of mankind differ greatly  in physical appearance, in susceptibility to specific diseases, and in  average intellectual capacity. There are indications that they differ  also in nervous organization, and possibly, in moral instincts. It would  be a miracle if that were not so, for, as is well known, the three  primary races were distinct and separate at the time that intelligent  men first appeared on this planet, and have so remained ever since. The  differences are so pronounced and stable that the proponents of  biological evolution are finding it more and more necessary to postulate  that the differences go back to species that preceded the appearance of  the homo sapiens. (See the new and revised edition of Dr. Carleton S.  Coon’s The Story of Man, New York, Knopf, 1962).
That such differences exist is doubtless deplorable. It is certainly  deplorable that all men must die, and there are persons who think it  deplorable that there are differences, both anatomical and spiritual,  between men and women. However, no amount of concerted lying by  “liberals,” and no amount of decreeing by the Warren [Supreme Court]  Gang, will in the least change the laws of nature.
Now there is a great deal that we do not know about genetics, both  individual and racial, and these uncertainties permit widely differing  estimates of the relative importance of biologically determined factors  and cultural concepts in the development of a civilization. Our only  point here is that it is highly improbable that biological factors have  no influence at all on the origin and course of civilizations. And to  the extent that they do have an influence, Spengler’s theory is  defective and probably misleading. 
Profound Insights
One could add a few minor points to the three objections stated  above, but these will suffice to show that the Spenglerian historionomy  cannot be accepted as a certainty. It is, however, a great philosophical  formulation that poses questions of the utmost importance and deepens  our perception of historical causality. No student of history needed  Spengler to tell him that a decline of religious faith necessarily  weakens the moral bonds that make civilized society possible. But  Spengler’s showing that such a decline seems to have occurred at a  definite point in the development of a number of fundamentally different  civilizations with, of course, radically different religions provides  us with data that we must take into account when we try to ascertain the  true causes of the decline. And his further observation that the  decline was eventually followed by a sweeping revival of religious  belief is equally significant.
However wrong he may have been about some things, Spengler has given us  profound insights into the nature of our own culture. But for him, we  might have gone on believing that our great technology was merely a  matter of economics—of trying to make more things more cheaply. But he  has shown us, I think, that our technology has a deeper  significance—that for us, the men of Western civilization, it answers a  certain spiritual need inherent in us, and that we derive from its  triumphs as satisfaction analogous to that which is derived from great  music or great art.
And Spengler, above all, has forced us to inquire into the nature of  civilization and to ask ourselves by what means—if any—we can repair and  preserve the long and narrow dikes that alone protect us from the vast  and turbulent ocean of eternal barbarism. For that, we must always honor  him.